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Abstract
This paper attempts to discuss several current issues about the veil. Three 
countries are selected, namely France, Iran, and Indonesia, due to their different 
policies and perspectives concerning the veil. Using discourse analysis, this paper 
examines the violation of  human rights, particularly those of  Muslim women, 
by the ban of  the veil in France and the obligation to wear it in Iran. Finally, 
inspired by the theoretical work of  Gramsci, this paper analyzes how the 
terms “secular” and “religious “are used by the state to justify their hegemony 
over certain minority groups. Moreover, this paper offers the “correct concept of  
secularism” as that entails civic reason, constitutionalism, and human-rights-
based citizenship, and proposed by An-Na’im as the best avenue to safeguard 
the problem of  human rights in France and Iran. The rest discussion of  this 
paper discusses Indonesia, the largest Moslem country in the world, that is, in 
fact,“a secular country” based on Pancasila, which respects religious freedom, 
including for women to wear the veil or not. It also opens full, equal, and fair 
access for all Indonesian women, regardless of  their ethnicity and religious 
affiliation, to compete in the workforce and to pursue education. The author’s 
intention is to clarify false stereotypes about the veil, to enlighten readers 
about abuse of  power by both French and Iranian governments in violating 
the rights of  women on the issue of  veil, and to inform readers --using the 
case of  Indonesia as an example-- about the importance of  state neutrality in 
supporting the rights of  freedom of  and from religion. 
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A. Introduction
Discourse about the veil today is always controversial and sparks a 
dichotomy between persons who support the veil and those who oppose 
it.1 Some Westerners have simplified the issue of  the veil to oppression 
by the male-dominated world in Islam, while others, particularly some 
Muslim women, contend that it is a symbol of  women’s liberation and 
piety. In addition, there is also the unavoidable phenomenon of  “the 
Islamic resurgence” which has emerged since the late 1970s with deep 
influence over religion, politics, and society in the rest of  the Islamic 
world.2 At the same time, the Muslim world must also face the unavoidable 
secularization through globalization, modernization, technology, 
media, and economics. Usually, much of  this influence comes from 
Western countries. These contradictory influences have triggered the 
widespread Islamophobia and Western paranoia on this globe between 
two competitive poles of  Muslim and non-Muslim societies.
Furthermore, the dispute over the veil is an important phenomenon 
to observe, because it does not only involve religious precepts, but also the 
political interests behind it. The concept of  the veil gradually mutates to 
encompass women’s bodies, privacy, counter-culture, law, “nationalism”, 
the state, human rights, and even Huntington’s “clash of  civilization”. 
France and Iran might be the perfect representations for the tension 
between the West/Secularism versus East/Islam. The state, which is 
supposed to be the leading pro-human rights organ, on the contrary, 
has benefited the law. In this case, as mentioned by Bourdieu, there is a 
tendency to transform the law into the means for a “field of  control”. 
In those two countries, the states intentionally give false definitions for 
the words “secularism” and “Islam” to their people in order to justify 
their political advantage.
1 The author would like to express gratitude to Dr. Amina Wadud who has 
given useful advice on how to develop and organize the theme of  the discourse of  
the veil and to give credit for Brittanny Jordan and Emma Nolan-Thomas for peer 
reviewing this paper.
2 Suzanne Brenner, “Reconstructing Self  and Society: Javanese Muslim Women 
and the Veil”, American Ethnologist, Vol. 23, No. 4 (1996), p. 673.
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Therefore, neither the laïcité of  France nor the Velayat-e-Faqih 
model from Iran is suitable for advocating the freedom of  and freedom 
from religion and belief  regarding the veiling discourse, due to their 
exclusiveness from diversity and the impossibility of  civic reason. The 
most appropriate style for human rights-based citizenship is An-Na’im’s 
version of  secularism, which is applied by Indonesia via its “Pancasila 
principles”. 
B. What is the Veil?
There is no essential definition for the term “the veil”. 
Heterogeneous Muslim cultures and traditions have created various 
meanings for the word “the veil”. Khaled Abou El Fadl3 labels the veil 
as al-hijab, which compels women to cover their entire body except for 
the face and the hands. For Carl W. Ernst, hijab is defined as “the curtain” 
as stated in Qur’anic verses: “When you ask them [the prophet’s wives] 
for something, ask them from behind a curtain (33: 53). Later, this kind 
of  hijab became the notion of  veiling, though at that time it concerned 
the Mohammed’s wives only. Historically, Muslim women imitated the 
customs of  upper-class Persian, Greek, Roman, and Jewish women as the 
benchmark of  their religious conduct. They wore the veil to evade men’s 
gaze in the street. This phenomenon is evidence of  the development of  
the function of  the veil: from the curtain for the wives of  the Prophets 
to the covering clothing worn by “decent” women, especially those who 
inhabit cities.4 
Meanwhile, according to Katherine Bullock, the term “hijab” stems 
from the Arabic (which has the root hajaba) meaning “to cover, conceal, 
hide, a complex notion encompassing action and apparel”. It means that 
one has to lower one’s stare and cover one’s body from navel to knee 
and it comprises covering the face or not. Nowadays, hijab refers to the 
headscarf  that women wear over their heads and tie or pin at the neck 
without enveloping their face.5 
3 Abou Khaled El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name: Islamic Law, Authority, and Women 
(Oxford: Bell & Bain, 2001), p. 102.
4 Carl W Ernst, Following Muhammad: Rethingking Islam in the Contemporary World 
(London: the University of  North Carolina Press, 2003), p. 148.
5 Katherine Bullock, Rethinking Muslim Women and the Veil (Richmond: The 
International Institute of  Islamic Thought, 2003). 
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Some researchers and authors on Islam, such as Suzanne Brenner 
(who conducted research in Java), employ the word “veiling” instead of  
“the veil”, referring to “the practice in which a woman covers her head 
(usually also covering her hair and neck—although rarely her face) and 
all of  her body except her hands”.6 In Indonesia, Brenner figured out 
that the veil is translated as jilbab, which implies the Islamic style-clothing 
for either head covering or all-enveloping Islamic cloth. Jilbab, at the 
beginning, was designated as the newer style of  Islamic clothing imported 
from the Middle East and used by mostly young women to contest the 
traditional sarong, kebaya, and loose headscarf  or woven cap worn by older 
Indonesian women. Due to the globalization and modernization which 
has caused Islamic women to dress up “fashionably”, today the jilbab is 
no longer identical with the Middle Eastern clothing. Many Indonesian 
women amalgamate traditional and foreign clothes with jilbab to look 
more attractive, stylist, but still well-suited within the Islamic tenets about 
modesty. Additionally, the increasing number of  women who wear jilbab 
in Indonesia has contributed to the progress of  Islamic fashion from 
time to time.7 
Nevertheless, following Ernst, the misleading stereotype about the 
veil as the icon of  repression in Islamic world has occurred as a result of  
associating the veil with the sort of  women’s clothing in Iran, Arabia, or 
Afghanistan. In Iran, women are required to wear the Iranian chador or 
“a black drape that envelops the body, with the exception of  the face and 
hands”.8 Recently, in the Teheran, it can be substituted by a raincoat and 
a headscarf  called a manteau.9 Moreover, they are not allowed to apply 
facial makeup. Likewise, according to Ernst, the Afghan government 
mandates that Pusthun women must follow their traditional tribal code, 
6 Suzanne Brenner,  “Reconstructing Self  and Society”, p. 691. 
7 For detailed information regarding “politics of  the veil” for economic inter-
est all over the world, see Patrick Haenni, “l’Économie Politique de la Consommation 
Musulamanne” at http://religion.info/pdf2008_11_consommation:pdf.
8 Ernst, Following Muhammad, p. 147
9 This word is originated from French. Manteau is usually accompanied with 
“rosary” or a scarf.  These two things have created so-called “hijab chic”. Faruqui also 
demonstrates that the globalization and modernization in Iran has resulted in more 
liberal expression among Iranian women via their colorful rosary. Some of  them even 
modify it so that they can show off  their hair. See Munis D. Faruqui, “Iran: Renegotiating 
a ‘Revolutionary Identity”,   Economic and Political Weekly Vol. 33, No. 31 (1998), p. 2071.
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namely the all-encompassing burqas. The chador and burqa are not similar 
to the abaya, which belongs to Arabian women. 
In Western countries, the veil is known by various names. French 
people translate “the veil” as le foulard or le voile which is associated with the 
headscarf  related to the Arabic immigrants who belong to the Berber and 
Arab ethnicities. Some French pro-republicans also argue about whether 
the bandana can be associated with the veil or not. The controversy 
over the ban of  such headscarves—known as l’affaire du foulard—has 
been a major issue of  the state recently. Similarly, even more tolerant 
European countries like England, whose immigrant Muslims come from 
the Commonwealth, like Indians and Malaysians, are dealing with similar 
disputes. However, the problem in England concerns the niqab, which 
covers a woman’s entire face except her eyes. The Netherlands, which 
has become home to Muslims from the Balkans and Indonesia, is also 
attempting to prohibit the burqa, not the veil.10 
Despite all debates regarding “the veil”, actually the Qur’an itself  
does not mention a rigid definition of  the word “the veil”. The Qur’anic 
verses only mention the rule for Muslim women to dress modestly and 
lower their gaze (24:31, and 33: 59). It is the conception of  “modesty” 
and God’s commandment not to “display their (women’s) beauty” 
which provokes many interpretations among Muslim scholars.11 The 
first group—as noted by Poulter—believes that covering the hair and 
neck represents “modesty”. Meanwhile, another group insists that “the 
women’s beauty” in Qur’an refers to the entire face. This interpretation 
is held by a minority school of  thought. Saudi jurists even require the 
covering of  everything excluding the eyes or one eye.12 The rest reject 
covering either their hair, neck, or face since they argue that they are part 
of  the “ordinary appearance of  women”.13 Though they do not wear the 
veil, adherents of  this understanding choose loose-fitting clothing, which 
covers their body, and avoid tight and transparent garments. 
10 Joanne Wallach Scott, The Politics of  the Veil (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2007), pp.1-3. 
11 Sebastian Poulter, “Muslim Headscarves in School: Contrasting Legal Ap-
proaches in England and France”,  Oxford Journal of  Legal Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 
1997), p. 46. 
12 Abou Khaled El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name, p. 104.
13 Afshar, as cited by Sebastian Poulter, “Muslim Headscarves in School”, p.  46.
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Furthermore, according to Khaled Abou El Fadl, the veil aims 
at preventing human beings from fitnah, which is considered by some 
people as the particular acts producing the type of  sexual stimulation that 
is conducive to the commission of  sin. In Islamic discourses themselves, 
fitnah is associated with chaos, disorder, inducement, and the opening 
of  the doors to evil. Moreover, the Qur’a>n is more likely to use the term 
fitnah as the cause of  ordeals and problems, such as money, rather than 
the origin of  sexual seduction.14 
El-Fadl also stated that early Islamic reports demonstrate that the 
veil has to do more with social status and physical safety than fitnah. In 
accord with social status, in Indonesia wearing the veil can be connected 
with prestige, e.g. to be respected as hajj, to be recognized as the daughter 
or the wife of  prominent Islamic leaders in kampong, to be identified 
as the head of  particular Islamic organizations or parties, and so forth. 
Meanwhile, the reason of  safety is correlated with the awrah or, as 
defined by El Fadl, what is considered as the private parts which ought 
to be covered by clothing. Similarly, Suzanne Brenner explains the term 
awrah by referring to the affirmation of  Leila Ahmed: “blind in one eye, 
blemished, defective; the genital area; generally parts of  the body that 
are shameful and must be concealed; women’s bodies; women’s voices; 
and women”.15 Thus, Saba Mahmood16 adds that women should ‘hide 
their charms’ when in public to prevent the libidinal energies of  men 
who are not the members of  their kinship. 
This moral issue is one of  the ultimate reasons for Muslim women 
to wear the veil. The research conducted by Suzanne Brenner about 
Muslim women wearing the veil in Java reveals that the veil serves as: (1) 
both the embodiment and ensoulment17 of  religious piety, (2) Muslim 
identity around the world, and (3) the reconstruction of  the society 
14 Abou Khaled El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name p. 232
15 Suzanne Brenner, “Reconstructing Self  and Society”, p. 692.
16 Saba Mahmood, Politics of  Piety: the Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject 2005 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 50.
17 See Talal Asad, Reading a Modern Classic: W.C. Smith’s The Meaning and End of  
Religion (Chicago: University of  Chicago Pres, 2001), p. 218. This term is coined by Talal 
Asad which refers to the potential capability of  the living body to use its emotional pain 
to cultivate righteous stance. Moreover, embodiment is denoted in the sense “human 
action and experience are placed in material body”. 
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via individual and communal self-discipline. Besides, as revealed by 
Katherine Bullock’s enterprise in Canada, Muslim women regard the veil 
as a vehicle for combating male harassment, gaining respect from men, 
and countering old Western conceptions of  beauty. Another different 
motive to take on the veil, which is usually adopted by Arabic women, is 
grounded in pride of  the original Arabic traditions and the motivation 
to perpetuate this “veiling tradition” for their daughters.
Unfortunately, as affirmed by Carl W. Ernst, the false notion from 
the Western world which associates the veil with “the backwardness” has 
widened the gap between Islamic and Western cultures. In the past, such 
an excuse was even used as justification by Europeans to invade Asia 
and Africa, so that they could set “these oppressed veiling women” free 
and lead them to modernity. They insisted that Muslim women could 
become “civilized” if  they took off  their veil. In this postcolonial era, 
there is a tendency to recognize that the ban of  the veil has to do with 
a misunderstanding of  Islam in European countries, such as France. It 
also bared the way for the increasing Islamic thrust as well. In addition, 
the Western mass media has excessively exposed skewed judgments 
about Muslim women as passive, repressed, and marginalized victims 
within “the Islamic communities”. Thus, Westerners assume that these 
“miserables” need “Western heroes” to liberate them.18 
From such narrow conceptions, it seems that these Westerners 
ignore the Enlightenment brought by Muslims, which saved Europeans 
from the darkness. They also reject the tokens about the significant roles 
played by many veiled Muslim women all over the globe in this modern 
era, even in the Western world. For example, Mahidur Özdemir,19 who 
became the youngest member and the first veiled women in the Belgian 
Parliament, Yvonne Ridley, the former British journalist who converted 
to Islam, three veiled Indonesian women who were the recent winners 
18 Lila-Abu-Lughod, “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological 
Reflection on Cultural Relativism and Its Others”, American Anthropologist, Vol. 3, No. 
104  (2002): pp. 783-790; as cited by Sakhroni, “Shirin Ebadi, Transcender of  Divisive 
Boundaries”, ISIM Newsletter, Vol. 13 (December 2003), pp. 6-7. 
19 “Mahinur Özdemir (CDH): ”On me diabolise à cause de mon foulard”, 
Election, May 2009.
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of  L’Oreal Indonesia Fellowships for Women in Science,20 and many 
other Muslim women. Currently, it is also common to see veiled Muslim 
studying in the world’s top-ranked universities like Harvard, Oxford, 
Yale, Cambridge, Leiden, and other prestigious scholarly institutions. 
Nevertheless, Westerners, Europeans in particular, keep arguing that the 
removal of  the veil will lead Muslim women into “advancement” and 
“modernization”. 
C. What is Behind l’affaire du foulard in France? 
The following explanations will describe the headscarf  controversy 
in France that has been an international issue since the Creil tragedy, and 
also uncover the hidden motive behind it. As proven by Joan Wallach 
Scott, in her extraordinary work, The Politics of  the Veil, the headscarf  
controversy (l’affaire du foulard) is primarily caused by the racist frenzy of  
Jean-Marie Le-Pen’s followers and their anti-immigrant ideas. Le Pen was 
the leader of  the National Front party, which often publicly expressed 
xenophobia. For him, the veil is not only linked with the 9/11 tragedy, 
murders, and bombings in Europe, but also with the ethnic/cultures 
coming from Maghrébien.21 The French government is still haunted by 
the memories of  the Algerian revolutionaries, who took advantage of  
veiled women to carry messages, money, grenades, and weapons to 
guerilla soldiers who were trying to free the country from the French in 
1958. In this case, the resistance over imperialism, of  which Scott also 
20 “Tiga Perempuan Peneliti Indonesia Raih ‘for Woman in Science”, Kompas, 
December  2009.
21 Scott elaborates that Maghrébiens (Maghreb is derived from Arabic word which 
means “The western direction”) are the people from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia in 
North Africa which used to be the French colony and protectorates. However, such 
a label is likely to be associated more with the Arabs who inhabited those countries, 
mainly Algeria. The black people from Algeria who today reside in Europe are called 
les pieds noirs (literally imply “the black feet”).  Though the Berbers are another ethnic 
group originating from Algeria, their European looks, plus the increasing numbers 
of  Berberian-Christian converts, have made it easier for them to “integrate” with the 
French. Therefore, the Berber clan has a higher social level than the Arabs. Parallel to 
Scott’s depiction, Cesari  as cited in Bowen 2005, 330) highlights the discrimination 
against Muslims born in France (les beurs) by the government and environment through 
the ascribed-status given to them either as “Maghrébien”, “Arabs”, or “Muslims”. It seems 
that they will never be fully accepted as “French”. 
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spoke, was manifested through the donning of  the veil. The “crusade” 
between Algerian-Arab-Muslims with the French-Christians continued 
when Colonel Boumedienne, the nationalist Algerian President, claimed 
that Algeria was an Islamic nation. Accordingly, Algerian women must 
not copy Western (French) culture. Such a statement was “a revenge” for 
Charles de Gaulle’s argument in 1959 that made the analogy of  French 
and Arabs being like oil and vinegar: these two societies would never 
be united. 
At the present time, this anti-immigrant sentiment is inherited 
from French predecessors to the Republican ruling elites by using laïcité 
principles as an alibi. Laïcité is “the French version of  secularism”.22 This 
refers to the total division between the state and religion. The state works 
hard to create a “universalism” or sameness of  all individuals (La droit 
à la resemblance).23 Consequently, particular religious societies can lose 
their freedom of  religion or belief. The antonym of  “universalism” is 
“communalism” (communautarisme), as adopted by the United States, or 
other types of  secularism, which safeguards both religion and atheism 
from intervention by the state. This has fostered pluralism (la droit à la 
difference) in United States. 
Historically, the headscarf  controversy appeared for the first time 
in 1989 in Creil, a city located in northern France.24 At that time, three 
veiled girls were expelled by Eugène Chénière, the headmaster of  a school 
in Creil. Next, it is hard to disagree with Joan Wallach Scott’s analysis 
that the controversial bill of  veil prohibition has to do with the political 
game. After “his merit” in imposing “the principles of  laïcité” to the 
immigrant girls, Eugène Chénière became the deputy from the Raillement 
22 Joan Wallach Scott, The Politics of  the Veil, p. 15
23 Poulter reveals that the French government defends itself  in the sense of  
“anti-pluralism” by appointing the jargon of  Jacobin as the foundation of  the country: 
“La République est une et indivisible (the Republic is one and indivisible)”.  This requires 
each citizen to prioritize the “Republican identity” and marginalize one’s individual’s 
persona, such as religion, ethnicity, language, etc.  The state of  France never gave any 
clear standard for what kind of  “Republican identity” must be possessed by its people. 
But, in fact, this is in conflict with the French Declaration of  the Rights of  Man and 
of  the Citizen 1789 which guarantees equal protection for all citizens before the law 
and also the famous motto of  the French Republic: Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité (Freedom, 
Equality, Brotherhood). 
24 Sebastian Poulter, “Muslim Headscarves in School”, p. 43.
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pour la Républic in 1994. He offered a controversial bill for the prohibition 
of  all “conspicuous (ostentatoire)” signs, which was supported by François 
Bayrou, The Minister of  National Education. As a result, Bayrou outlawed 
“conspicuous” signs and permitted only “discreet” religious symbols in 
schools. The third period of  the headscarf  controversy began in 2003 
and was triggered by a proposal from Nicolas Sarkozy, the minister of  the 
interior, requiring an unveiled pose of  Muslim women for formal identity 
photographs. Finally, the government endorsed the law prohibiting the 
veil in public schools on March 15, 2004:25 
In public elementary, middle and high schools, the wearing of  signs or 
clothing which conspicuously manifests students’ religions affiliations 
is prohibited. Disciplinary procedures to implement this rule will be 
preceded by a discussion with the student.
The clothing and religious signs prohibited are conspicuous signs such as 
a large cross, a veil, or a skullcap. Not regarded as signs indicating religious 
affiliations are discreet signs, which can be, for example, medallions, small 
crosses, stars of  David, hands of  Fatima, or small Korans. 
This implausible regulation is certainly worth examining. It is the 
term “conspicuous” which has been generating worldwide debate recently. 
For Poulter, the French government circumscribes “conspicuous” as 
the icons of  proselytism or indifference. It is obvious that this law is 
intentionally created only for veiled women, because it allows for the 
donning of  small crosses, which are regarded as “discreet” religious 
symbols. In fact, the French government cannot answer several questions. 
Who has the right to determine whether a veil is “conspicuous” or not? 
How do the teacher and the state decide which students are wearing the 
veil for fashion, tradition, or conviction? If  religion is not compatible 
with laïcité, then why are small crosses permissible? Why do Muslim 
women become the “target” for the enforcement of  this law instead of  
men who have more vicarious “conspicuous” insignia, namely the beard? 
How do Maghrébien girls plan to engage in proselytism or endanger the 
laïcité only with their veil? 
 In addition, the statement “disciplinary procedures to implement 
this rule will be preceded by a discussion with the student” is not true. 
Many cases show that the school and the state choose “the coercive 
25 Joan Wallach Scott, the Politics of  the Veil, p. 1. 
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power” to expel the veiled girls from school rather than “discussing the 
law” with them. Thus, by observing this unjust law, no wonder that Dennis 
Pelletier describes it as “the exceptional law”.26 This has strengthened my 
aforementioned thesis that the headscarf  controversy is the manifestation 
of  French government exclusivity over their former colonial territories’ 
traditions and religion. 
D. Velayat-e-Faqih, the Theocracy or Clergy Authority?
The Islamic Republic of  Iran declares that they apply theocracy as 
their political system. Cherabi explains that it implies “God is recognized 
as the immediate ruler and God’s laws are taken as the legal code of  the 
community and are expounded and administered by holy men as God’s 
agent”.27 Such a model is supported by velayat-e-faqih or the guardianship 
of  a Supreme Leader who is a prominent cleric appointed based on “his” 
knowledge of  fiqh and regiopolitical record. He serves as the guide for 
Iranians under God’s justice.28 Besides, there are also marja chosen by 
the Iranian people to be “role models”.29 
Nevertheless, many prominent Islamic scholars, such as An-
Naim, hesitate regarding the purity of  “God’s laws” in shari>‘a-based 
countries. According to him, shari>‘a is not a godly paradigm, but a human 
interpretation of  the divine. Therefore, as there is a tendency that the 
religious realm will be influenced by personal views, it is important to 
keep the religious neutral.30 The menace of  the “politization of  religion”31 
and the tendency of  misusing the law by the patriarchal and authoritarian 
26 Pelletier, Dennis, “l’École, l’Éurope, les Corps: la laïcité et le voile”,  Vingtième 
Siècle, Revue d’histoire. Numéro Spécial: laïcité, séparation, sécularisation 1905-2005, No. 87 
(Jul-Sept 2005), p. 162. 
27 H.E. Cherabi, “Religion and Politics in Iran: How Theocratic is Islamic Re-
public?”, Daedalus, Vol. 120 No. 3   (1991), p. 69.
28 Bakman Baktiari, “Dilemmas of  Reform and Democracy in the Islamic Re-
public of  Iran,” in Robert W. Hefner (ed.), Remaking Muslim Politics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2005), p. 114.
29 H.E. Cherabi, “Religion and Politics in Iran”, p. 69.
30 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of  
Shari’a (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 85.
31 Pratap Bahnu Mehta,“On the Possibility of  Religious Pluralism”, in Thomas 
Banchoff  (ed.), Religious Pluralism, Globalization, and World Politics (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), p. 87.
Dian Maya Safitri
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 48, No. 1, 2010 M/1431 H92
regime32 justifies An-Naim’s proposal about the separation between the 
state and religion. But, religion still can influence politics and enter the 
public sphere. 
In relation to Iranian women, the state draws boundaries between 
“religious” and “non-religious” women by imposing the typical Iranian 
veil named chador. Even non-Muslim women are obligated to wear a 
chador. In almost all public places, we can find many signs about the 
order to dress up according proper Islamic norms of  “hijab” because 
bad “hijab” equals disloyalty to their husbands. They are not allowed to 
apply cosmetics. If  they break the law, basij33 will warn them.34
Similar with French’s laïcité, which resists immigrant traditions, the 
main reason for compelling chador, according to Faruqui, is to prevent the 
penetration of  “westernotoxification”. Yet, there are no clear explanations 
from the Iranian government about what kind of  western influences are 
“poisonous” for the state and how effective the chador is to handle “bad 
western influences”. Contrastingly, such a law generates a paradoxical 
reality among young people. The extreme limitation against “western 
clothing”, followed by the division between men and women in public 
spaces has caused private parties where the sexes can share alcoholic 
beverages and close relationships.35 As this example shows, the obligation 
to don the veil remains ineffective. 
In addition, the compulsion to take on the veil per se contradicts 
the Islamic tenet which affirms that there is no coercion in religion 
(2:256). The abuse of  religious freedom in this law is incompatible with 
the principle of  Islam as rah}ma lil-alami>n (compassionate and justice for 
all mankind). Thus, the Iranian interpretation of  “Islamic justice” is 
contestable. 
 This law also shares the same notion of  “universalism” like 
in France. It means that all distinguished people must have a “single 
identity”, namely the “Iranian Muslim identity”, and are unable to express 
their own tradition and religion, the non-Muslim faith in particular. This 
is in opposition to the Qur’anic verse which emphasizes tolerance:
32 Madhavi Sunder, “Piercing the Veil,” The Yale Law Journal , Vol.112 (2003), 
p. 1406.
33 A volunteer-based extra-military arm of   the government.
34 Munis D. Faruqui, “Iran: Renegotiating”, p. 2071.
35 Bakman Baktiari, “Dilemmas of  Reform”, p. 126.
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O Mankind! We have created you male and female, and have made you 
nations and tribes so that you might (affectionately) come to one another... 
[...] (49:13)
It is obvious that God intentionally creates different human beings 
so that we all learn to respect each other. If  God is indeed omnipotent, it 
would be easy for God to make this entire world with a unique culture-
based Muslim population. Yet, homogeneity will never teach us how 
to unite in diversity. The Iranian state and clerics ignore this and keep 
imposing the “Islamic teaching” for their own contingency.
Furthermore, like France, the Iranian government cannot clarify 
why there is no “hijab regulation for men.” It seems that it is only women 
who have to “fight against” the Western infiltration by wearing the veil. In 
other words, stemming from Saba Mahmood’s standpoint36 the concept 
of  “modesty” is the construction made by patriarchal evaluations, images, 
and representations over the subjection of  women’s bodies. Paraphrasing 
Beauvoir’s concept, men define women as “the other” to subordinate 
the position of  women. In the case of  the compulsory hijab in Iran, 
the state uses what Saba Mahmood labels as a “politics of  piety” to 
demonstrate the male “socio-political control” over Muslim (and non-
Muslim women). The state takes advantage of  the word “religion” to 
make “borders” between “the west” and “us”. Such a misleading paradigm 
has transformed the original essence of  shari>‘ah from sources of  moral 
norms and values via a democratic political process37 into a daunting 
biased law enforced by a “religious” institution. Accordingly, the Iranian 
state model is inapplicable in the modern era due to its inferiority and 
violation of  women’s religious freedom in velayat-e-faqih. 
Civic reason refers to the entitlement given to all citizen and social 
actors to express their opinion publicly. The state can adopt their opinions 
in the formulation of  public policy or legislation. However, the state 
must be an agency independent from the intervention of  any particular 
group. This civic reason must be guarded by the underlying function of  
constitutionalism which will guarantee that the views and interests of  
citizens are well served by the ruling elites.38 
36 Saba Mahmood, Politics of  Piety”, p. 158.
37 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im,  Islam and the Secular State, p. 1.
38 Ibid., p. 93-103.
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Both France and Iran have failed to facilitate civic reason for several 
reasons. First, particular societies have taken over the formulation of  
public policy. In France, it is the secular group that possesses hegemonic 
power, whereas in Iran, the clergy’s views are dominant. Such non-
neutral states have closed the possibility for accountable and transparent 
constitutionalism. 
Second, the state authorities in France and Iran have dismissed the 
opportunity for human-right-based citizenship proven by the exclusive 
identity constructed by the government. The refusal of  “communalism” 
in these two countries paves the way for a mutual relationship between 
the state and the diverse social actors. As a result, the minority group is 
marginalized by the majority. 
Lastly, both laïcité and velayat-e-faqih are not concerned with the 
dynamic set of  values in constitutionalism, which can be perceived through 
a trial-and-error process. For them, the notion of  constitutionalism and 
even human rights are only abstract ideas, or worse, pieces of  papers, 
because the government does not take tangible action for developing 
human rights. For instance, French leaders still hold xenophobic 
perspectives which block the progress of  human rights. Likewise, the 
confiscation of  Shirin Ebadi’s39 Nobel award40 has sealed the door toward 
human entitlement in Iran.
In sum, the above-mentioned explanations show the difficulties 
for civic reason in French and Iranian governments. As the state is not 
autonomous, the majority have discriminated against the minority, and 
the foundation of  France and Iran ignores the value of  human rights, so 
that their people cannot rely on the state to enjoy democracy.
E. Indonesian Pancasila: the Middle Way
I will begin this part by listing the five principles of  Pancasila, 
which are the most important pillars of  law in Indonesia. They are: (1) 
monotheism, (2) humanitarianism, (3) national unity, (4) representative 
39 Human right activist in Iran
40 “Iran Sewot Terima Kritik Penyitaan Hadiah Nobel,” Kompas, November 
27, 2007.
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democracy by consensus, (5) social justice.41 Amin Abdullah42 and Suhadi 
Cholil43 stated that Pancasila has successfully accommodated theist and 
anti-theist leaders in Indonesia because religious values are regarded as 
the foundation of  Indonesian law, yet particular religions cannot intervene 
the state. To some extent, this really fits Cassanova’s dictum about the 
“deprivatization” of  religion, i.e. religion can enter the public dimension 
of  modern societies. It also supports Peter L. Berger44 who argues that 
religion and secularism should not be trapped in a “zero-sum” situation, 
and have to embrace reciprocal altruism instead. 
However, while the concept of  “one God” is the first principle 
of  Pancasila, practically the Indonesian government has made positive 
progress related to the “freedom of ” and “freedom from” religion45 
from the Soekarno era until the Reformation. This progress includes 
the elimination of  the “seven controvercial words” in the Preamble 
of  the 1945 constitution, the so-called Piagam Jakarta, namely “the 
Indonesian state is based on the belief  in the one, supreme God with 
the obligation the adherents of  Islam to implement the shari>‘a”.46 In 
the National Assembly Meeting (Sidang Umum) in 2001 and 2002, 
even Muhammadiyah and Nadlatul Ulama, the two biggest Indonesian 
Muslim organizations, rejected the proposals to enact the Islamic law.47 
Progress can also be seen in the fact that Indonesia is the only country 
in the world which recognizes 6 official religions (Islam, Christianity, 
Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism) without any 
particular religion taking over the state. Confucianism was restricted in 
41 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Islam and the Secular State, p. 223.
42 Amin Abdullah “Celebrating Differences Through Dialogue in Indonesia: The 
Significant of  Understanding Religions Today” (2009), unpublished paper, presented 
during the seminar entitled “Vatican-Indonesia Interfaith Dialogue” held by Sunan 
Kalijaga Islamic University Yogyakarta which invited Cardinal Jean-Louis Tauran.
43 Suhadi Cholil, “Freedom of  Religion or Belief  in Indonesia after the Refora-
mation Era 1998”, (1998), Paper, unpublished.
44 Peter L. Berger, “Foreword”, in Nancy T. Ammerman (ed.), Everyday 
Religion:Observing  Modern Religious Lives (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 9.
45 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future 
of  Shari’a, p.97
46 Ayzumardi, “Islamic Perspective on the Nation-State: Political Islam in Post-
Soeharto Indonesia,” Al-Jamiah, No. 39 (2001), p. 306.
47 Robert W. Heffner, “Muslim Democrats”, p. 298.
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the Soeharto era, but is at present legalized by the state via the Presidential 
Decision no. 6/2000. The freedom of  religion or belief  is safeguarded 
by the Indonesian government in the 1945 constitution. Additionally, 
Indonesians are permitted “to leave blank the religious identity line of  
the ID”, and the possibility of  indigenous religion adherents to register 
their marriage legally.48 The 2000 amendment became the umbrella for 
social, political, civil, and economic rights. This amendment adopts the 
structure of  a Bill of  rights which is similar to the Universal Declaration 
of  Human Rights49 rather than any state-based shari>‘a law found in this 
world. Finally, the published election results in 2004 revealed that fewer 
votes were obtained by Islamic parties and other religion-based parties 
than the nationalist or secular parties. 
Within the gender mainstreaming framework, the Indonesian 
government genuinely implements the articles in the 1945 constitution, 
including equal rights to education, information, employment, and 
citizenship regardless of  ethnicity, gender, or religious affiliations. Besides, 
the Indonesian state carries out the underlying regulations in CEDAW 
to fight discrimination against women as well.50 Unlike France and Iran 
which are still dealing with the issue of  having a female president, the 
majority of  Indonesians elected Megawati, an unveiled Muslim woman, 
as the first supreme leader in 2001, through a democratic and transparent 
election. Marie Elka Pangestu and Khofifah Indar Parawangsa also can 
be good examples of  state neutrality in Indonesia in the sense of  fair 
workforce competition. The first one is a non-Muslim Chinese woman 
trusted to be the Minister of  Trade for two presidential periods (2004-
2009 and 2009-2014), while the latter is a veiled Muslim woman appointed 
as the 5th Minister of  Women Affairs.
Likewise, in the dimension of  education, the secular state 
universities never take the veil into account. They are only concerned 
48 Suhadi Cholil, “Freedom of  Religion”, pp. 5-11.
49 Jeff  Herbert, “The Legal Framework for Human Rights in Indonesia”, in 
Tim Lindsey (ed.), Indonesian Law and Society (New South Wales: The Federation Press, 
2008), p. 457.
50 Based on Katjasungkana, Indonesia has endorsed the optional protocol of  
CEDAW in February 2000.  Article 5 of  CEDAW “imposes a positive duty on state 
parties to transform customs, practices, and attitudes that discriminate against women” 
(CEDAW, supra note 9, art.5) 
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about the students’ capability during the learning process. Some Christian 
and Muslim universities even bestow liberty for their female students 
who belong to different religions to take on the veil or not. It is also a 
common phenomenon in this modern era to see a veiled Muslim woman 
teaching in a Christian school and vice versa. From the elementary school 
until high school, students are taught religious subjects along with the 
“secular” curriculum.51 They are free to adopt the veil as part of  their 
uniform or not.52 
In the public domain, the state has established Komnas Perempuan 
(the National Commission for Women’s Rights)53 to disseminate ideas 
about gender equality and to eradicate any kind of  violence against 
women nationwide.54 Fueled by the freedom of  speech, media, and 
NGO, Indonesia has succeeded in facilitating civic reason, including 
discourse on women’s rights. So, it is not an exaggeration that Eldridge55 
appreciates Indonesia’s endeavor in terms of  human rights protection 
in the past seven years since 1998. 
Albeit each region is free to use the customary law and shari>‘a to 
foster local and traditional norms within directly and indirectly-governed 
territories in Indonesia,56 its regional government must obey the national 
law and 1945 amendment. For regional cases, which are not related to 
national issues, the state cannot engage in the Adat courts. Hence, the 
regulation to wear the veil for both Muslim and non-Muslim in Aceh and 
Padang are exemptions of  the freedom of  religion and belief  in Indonesia. 
Properly speaking, Indonesia is a country which is well-suited 
to An-Na’im’s version of  secularism in several respects. First, the 
51 Azra, “Islamic Perspective”, p. 300.
52 This is applicable only in state schools. In Indonesia, uniforms from elemen-
tary school until senior high school have their own color-based characteristics. These 
“universal uniforms” aim at getting rid of  the social gap between the poor and the rich. 
53 In the beginning, Komnas Perempuan, protected by the Presidential Decree 
no. 181 of  1998, functioned only to solve racial tension against Chinese women during 
the 1998 May riots. Now it serves to empower women emancipation and is not limited 
to the Chinese community. 
54 Katjasungkana, as cited by Jeff  Herbert, “The Legal Framework,” p. 477.
55 P. Eldridge, “Human Rights”, The Brown Journal of  World Affairs Vol. IX: 
(2002), p. 127.
56 Sebastian Pompe, “Between Crime and Custom: Extra-Marital Sex in Modern 
Indonesian Law”, in Tim Lindsey (ed.), Indonesian Law and Society, pp. 105-6.
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Indonesian government involves all citizens to express their opinion in 
public debate regarding particular issues. In fact, in the process of  civic 
reason, Indonesian state is autonomous from certain groups, either 
religious or secular. Second, Indonesia embraces the communalism 
which enables its people to manifest their own tradition and religion 
without forgetting the spirit of  nationalism. Third, the Indonesian state 
executes the principle of  human-right-based citizenship, by means of  
“ensuring that all of  inhabitants of  the territory have general and equal 
obligations and entitlements in their relation to the state”.57 The last, all 
parts of  Indonesian society (Komnas Perempuan, media, civil society) 
have made the state supportive of  women’s rights and religious freedom 
through their active movements. Borrowing An-Na’im’s idea, Indonesian 
society is the entity which has successfully rendered the state accountable 
for human rights.
F. Concluding Remarks
In summary, the abuse of  power through universalism and failure 
of  civic reason in France and Iran has violated women’s entitlements in 
the sense of  religious freedom. Indonesia, a Pancasila-based pluralist 
country, reflects An-Naim’s secularism due to its success in giving equal 
rights for women. 
The prohibition of  the veil in France and the compulsion of  chador 
in Iran are evidence of  state hegemony to alienate the “foreign influence” 
by using women’s body. The law is supposed to be the leading instrument 
to support human rights. But, the French and Iranian states “manipulate” 
the law of  the veil to discriminate against women. 
The ambiguous definition of  “secularism” and “religion” created 
by France and Iran must be deconstructed. Meanwhile, the model of  the 
Indonesian state bridges the gap between “secularism” and “religion”. 
This country also welcomes constitutionalism and the dynamic progress 
of  human rights. 
57 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Islam and the Secular State, p. 88.
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